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Case No. 920268 CA
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1989).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10.
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal
evidence as may be offered by any of the parties to the
proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess:
(1) the value of the property sought
to be condemned and all improvements
thereupon appertaining to the realty,
and each and every separate estate or
interest therein; and if it consists of
different parcels, the value of each
parcel and of each estate or interest
therein shall be separately assessed.
(2) if the property sought to be
condemned constitutes only a part of
a larger parcel, the damages which will
accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of its severance
from the portion sought to be condemned
and the construction of the improvement
in the manner proposed by the plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a*

This is a condemnation case filed in the Third

Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County.

The Plaintiff

acquired by this action property from the Defendant for the
construction of an interstate highway project in Salt Lake County.
b.

The case was tried to a jury with the Honorable Pat

B. Brian presiding.

After a verdict was rendered by the jury the

Defendant filed a Motion for Additur or in the Alternative for a
New Trial.
vi

c.

The trial court denied the Defendant's Motion for

Additur or in the Alternative a New Trial. The Defendant filed its
Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court and it was transferred
to the Utah Court of Appeals for decision.
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ISSUES (.U I / kPPKAL

I.

II.

lxl^

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN
REGARDING THE TESTIMONY OF
EXPERT WITNESSES REGARDING
WITH THE OWNER RELATIVE TO
OFFER•

ITS RULINGS
ONE OF UDOT'S
A CONVERSATION
A NEGOTIATED

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ALLOWING AN
EXPERT WITNESS TO TESTIFY REGARDING THE
DEVELOPMENT OF PROPERTIES SIMILAR TO THE
SUBJECT.
D I D T H E T R I A L C 0 U R T E R R I N I T S RULINGS

REGARDING THE USE OF HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS
ON CROSS-EXAMINATION.
IV.

WAS THE TESTIMONY AT THE TRIAL IN CONFORMITY
WITH THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON UDOT'S
MOTION IN LIMINE.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

the

instan

vocation of Subject and Highway Project History,

action acquired

Associates (the Owner

from

the Appellant

hree parcels of :=md fox Uie construcLxon

of, an Interchange on I Jib in the southeast part of the Salt Lake
Valley and the relocation of a roadway feeding into the interchange
(extension ot 6200 South) .
Complaint

•

Attached tci •

* f

a map depicting these parcels which identifies them by

number and shows their location

|K

]2,|

Parcel 207B:A (i , 624

acres) was acquired for the construct ion nf tin-" iiril; ei/rvhanqe a iici
Parcels 207B I 095 acres net) and 207B:2A (.012 acres net) were for
the relocation of Big Cottonwood Canyon Road (the extension of 6200
South),

i
n i-. 'i, ii |

hit- in "qui nit i (uiFi weu- f i mil ui iiaiiiej (jaief1.)

which contained approximately 21.23 acres.
The design for the 1-215 freeway was begun iii the early
i

1960's.

[R. 84.]

The interchange which was originally designed

for this location was a diamond configuration.

The location of

this interchange was approximately 6200 South and just east of
Holladay Boulevard in the southeast area of Salt Lake County, an
area

commonly

known

as

the

Holladay/Cottonwood

area.

The

intersection of Holladay Boulevard and 6200 South is referred to as
Knudsen's Corner.
In 1963 DDOT initiated a condemnation action to acquire
property from the Owner's predecessor in interest, Bettilyon, for
the construction of 1-215, including the designed diamond
interchange.

[R. 195.]

This case is referred to as

Bettilyon I by the trial court.

[R. 195.]

A second action was

brought to acquire additional property for modifications to the
diamond interchange in 1973. [R. 198.] This case is referred to by
the trial

court as Bettilyon II.

At

the time the diamond

interchange was designed there was no design for continuing 6200
South (Cottonwood Canyon Road) past the interchange from the west
to the east. The relocation of Cottonwood Canyon Road was part of
the interchange design within the interchange itself.

[UDOT's Ex.

P-l, Owner's Ex. D-A. Addendum Attachments 2 and 1.] [R. 198.]

In

1986 DDOT received approval to revise the interchange design from
a diamond configuration to an urban design.

[R. 85.]

change

in

was

based

in

part

on

revisions

The design

traffic

volume

projections, and the diamond design had serious capacity and safety
deficiencies for the projected volumes.

[R. 85.]

The urban

interchange design allowed for smoother, more free traffic flow.
[R. 85, Tr. 88, Tr. 589] The instant action was brought to acquire

2

the property needed for the urban interchange design. In addition
to the acquisition for the urban interchange, the acquisition of
two parcels was for the construction of a connecting road running
easterly from the interchange to Wasatch Boulevard.
P-2 Addendum Attachment 3.]

[UDOT's Ex.

[Tr. 112.]

Attached hereto are three exhibits depicting the subject
property.

Attachment 1 is a copy of Defendants Exhibit D-A which

shows the subject property in the before condition with the diamond
interchange design and the relocated Cottonwood

Canyon Road.

Attachment 2 is a copy of Plaintiff's Exhibit P-1 which is an
aerial photograph of the subject property with the existing road
system and the design of the diamond interchange imposed over the
photograph with various colors representing different aspects of
that design.

Attachment 3 is a copy of Plaintiff's Exhibit P-2

which is an aerial photograph of the subject property after the
construction of the urban interchange.

In Attachments 2 and 3 the

subject property is outlined in red.
The design of the urban interchange and the connecting
road provided the basis for determining the value of the subject
property after the taking.

UDOT filed a Motion in Limine for a

determination from the court as to the conditions to be assumed in
determining the value of the property before the taking. The trial
court ruled that in determining the value of the property
before the taking, the impact

of the diamond interchange as

designed at the time of the filing of the Bettilyon II (1973) case
would be considered.

[R. 193-206.]

3

The court ruled that UDOT's

design for 1-215 and the diamond interchange at that time was
final, that the design changes (for the urban interchange and the
extension of 6200 South) were not even remotely contemplated and
the Owner should have been able to rely on the finality of the
diamond design after 1973.

[R. 199, 200, 205.]

The diamond interchange design included the relocation of
Cottonwood Canyon Road

(6200 South extension east of Holladay

Boulevard) as required for the interchange construction.

This

relocation was under the interchange and connected with the
existing road system (existing Cottonwood Canyon Road before it
reached the Owner's frontage on that road).
Attachments 1 and 2.]

[Ex. D-A and Ex. P-l#

The Owner's contention that 6200 South

Cottonwood Canyon Road (6200 South) was to be somehow extended or
otherwise improved as part of the diamond interchange design is in
error.
Contrary to the contention of the Owner, all of UDOT's
witnesses considered the effect of the diamond inteFchange design
on the subject property in its condition before the taking in their
testimony.

[Beaufort Tr. 574-588.] [VanDrimmelen Tr. 636-639.]

[dinger Tr. 787-788.] The after condition was based on the design
of the urban interchange
connector road.
2.

(as constructed) and the 6200 South

[R. 12, Ex. P-2, Attachment 3.]

Highest and Best Use of the Subject Property.

There was a divergence of opinion between the expert
witnesses who testified for UDOT and those who appeared for the
Owner as to the highest and best use of the subject property both

4

in the before and after conditions.

UDOT's

witnesses testified

that the highest and best use both before and after the taking was
for low density professional and business office.
789-794 before. 1

[Tr. 646-654,

[Tr. 676-682, 804-805 after. 1 Witnesses for the

Owner testified that the highest and best use of the subject before
the taking was for office or business use with some mixed-in
commercial uses.

[Tr. 265, 447.]

It is somewhat difficult to

determine what the opinions of the Owner's witnesses were regarding
the highest and best use of the subject property after the taking.
Mr. Brown, one of the Owner's appraisal witnesses, said in answer
to a question from its counsel regarding the after highest and best
use, that it no longer had "any commercial development potential."
[Tr. 472.]

In an attempt to have him clarify his answer, Owner's

counsel asked him the following question:
Q.

By commercial development potential, do
you mean business, as well ... business
orientation ... when you say commercial,
you mean retail as well as office space,
do you?

A.

Yes, sir, I do.
[Tr. 472.]

Later, counsel for the Owner asked Mr. Brown again to
give his opinion of the highest and best use after the taking. Mr.
Brown's response was:
A.

That's questionable, Mr. Campbell.

I have

attempted to determine the highest and best
5

use, but it is now a secondary type of
property in the market.
[Tr. 476.]
The other appraisal witness for the Owner, Mr. Cook,
testified that the highest and best use after the taking was
"somewhat cloudy" but still had some "hampered" "business park type
uses."

[Tr. 289.]
3.

Development Potential After the Taking.

The position taken by the Owner regarding development of
the subject property after the taking was:
Because access was only available
from the east AFTER the taking, planning
principles, regulations and guidelines
would not permit the type of access
that would enable reasonable business
or residential development on the
subject property.
The Owner's Brief P. 7. [Emphasis
added.]
The Owner's witness, Mr. DeMass who testified regarding
engineering issues for the Owner, stated:
A.

As far as developable access, when
you travel the freeway or any road, you
want to turn off and get to wherever you
are going in the quickest, most expeditious
way.

...

So, as far as developable access,

very questionable.

I say there isn't any.

[Tr. P. 86, 87.] [Emphasis added.]
The Owner's witness Mr. Brown, testified in this regard:
A.

Mr. Campbell, 30th East is a mere
6

back-door access into this subject
property.

There would be access to it

but it would not be a developable access.
[Tr. 467.]
•••

[Emphasis added.]

all of the developable access to the

subject property had been acquired bv the
government in the action.

. ..

It is now a piece of property that no
longer has any commercial development
potential.
[Tr. 471, 472.]

[Emphasis added.]

It no longer has the viability of
development that it enjoyed in the before
condition.
[Tr. 477.]
UDOT's witnesses testified that the subject property
could be developed in the after condition with the access control
along the newly aligned Cottonwood Canyon Road (6200 South) for the
same uses as in the before condition.

[Tr. 806-808.]

The access

remaining after the taking consisted of approximately 650 feet of
uncontrolled frontage on 3000 East.

[Tr. 810.]

All of UDOT's

witnesses testified that this was ample for development purposes.
[Tr. 808.]
In support of that conclusion, Mr. dinger, one of the
DDOT's

appraisal

witnesses,

referred

to

comparable

sales of

properties that had been developed for business and commercial uses
7

near interchanges having access restrictions similar to the subject
in the after condition.

[Tr. 820-821.]

He also testified that the

comparable sales he used in determining the before value would be
equally applicable in determining after value.

The accessibility

conditions of the subject and the comparables were similar.

[Tr.

866.]
In addition Mr. dinger

testified regarding several

properties with access control conditions and locations similar to
those of the subject in the after condition that had been developed
for business office and commercial uses to support his conclusion
that the subject property was developable in its after condition
for those uses.
and 24.]

[Tr. 810-821.] [UDOT's Exhibits 19, 20, 21, 22, 23

This evidence was in stark contrast to that offered by

the Owner that the remaining property was not developable in its
after condition for those uses.
4.

VanDrimmelenfs Testimony Regarding an Offer to
Purchase.

As indicated above, the position of the Owner was that
the subject had commercial potential before the taking that was
eliminated in its after condition by UDOT's taking and
construction. Mr. VanDrimmelen, one of UDOT's appraisal witnesses
testified that, in his judgment, if the property could have been
developed in the before condition for commercial uses it could be
developed in the after condition.

He gave as support for this

conclusion (1) that there were many commercial developments near
interchanges that were not accessible "just off the interchange"
and

(2) that interest in the subject property for commercial
8

development had been reported to him by the Owner through one of
its partners, Mr. Jacobsen.

Mr. Jacobsen stated there was such

interest with or without access to 6200 South expressed by an oil
company for a possible convenience store site. [Tr.685.]

Counsel

for the Owner objected to this testimony and the court struck the
testimony as it "related to a negotiated offer."

[Tr. 685, 686.]

The Owner's Counsel subsequently sought a further ruling on the
matter and the court struck all references to the values mentioned
in the offer.

[Tr. 694-700.]

The statement by Mr. Jacobson,

regarding an offer for commercial development

of the subject

property after the taking was inconsistent with the testimony the
Owner submitted at trial that the property was not developable for
those uses.
5.

Hypothetical Questions on Cross-Examination.

The Owner claims it was somehow prejudiced by not being
allowed to ask UDOT's witnesses hypothetical questions relating to
the subject property. The questions posed changed the facts of the
case and did not represent either the condition of the subject
property in its before or after condition.

Counsel asked the

witness to assume that the north portion of the subject property
sold before the taking from the south.

The question not only

assumed facts not in evidence but was contrary to the facts of the
case.

It served no useful purpose to allow such questions and

would have been confusing to the jury.

The Owner's counsel was

allowed to ask related questions, including some hypothetical
questions, to obtain the information he sought.

9

[Tr. 721, 723,

761, 762.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The issues raised by the Owner by this appeal are all
based on either misconceptions of the facts, and/or the law as
applied

to the facts or flagrant mischaracterization

of the

evidence. This case was fairly tried to a jury with both UDOT and
the Owner given an opportunity to submit their respective positions
to the jury for a decision.
1.

The Owner misconstrued the "offer" testimony of

UDOT's witness both factually and as the law applies to the actual
facts.

The

"offer"

was

referred

to

by

UDOT's

witness,

VanDrimmelen, not as a comparable sale in support of his value
conclusion. It was submitted in response to the Owner's claim that
the subject property could not be developed for commercial purposes
after the taking by UDOT.

The "offer" went to the issue of

indicating an interest in the property by a commercial developer
after the taking.

Offers that indicate a demand for the property

for particular use are, under the law, admissible.
The "offer" came to VanDrimmelen in an extrajudicial
statement by the Owner that indicated an interest in the property
after the taking for commercial development which was inconsistent
with the evidence it presented at trial.

This statement was

admissible as an admission against interest.
The only reason the testimony on this point survived at
trial was because Owner's counsel revived the issue after the court
struck the "offer" reference from the record.

10

The issue become

moot at this point.
2.

UDOT's witness, dinger, used examples of developed

sites on or near interchanges that had access restrictions similar
to those of the subject property in its after condition.

Such

testimony is admissible, 1) as rebuttal to the Owner's contention
that such properties could not be developed, 2) as a part of the
basis for his expert opinion regarding the accessibility of the
subject property in its after condition for development purposes,
3) under the law as a factor that should be considered by a real
estate appraiser, and 4) as an accepted practice in the industry
(acknowledged by Owner's witness Cook).
3.

The Owner was afforded the opportunity to cross

examine UDOT witnesses in all areas including those where the court
sustained objections regarding questions about the subject property
that assumed facts contrary to the evidence.

By asking other

questions, even other hypothetical questions, the Owner was allowed
to

cover

the

subject

matter

it

sought

to

explore

by

the

objectionable hypothetical questions.
Allowing

hypothetical

questions, which assume facts

contrary to the evidence, in any event, is discretionary with the
court. The trial court did not abuse its discretion on this issue.
4.

The Owner in its brief, grossly misstated UDOT's

testimony by claiming that UDOT witnesses "subverted and violated
what plainly had become the law of the case."
35.)

(Owner's Brief P.

The Owner stated in its brief that UDOT's offered evidence

was that the subject property in its before condition "did not

IX

benefit from the freeway interchange" under the diamond design.
This

statement

is

simply

incorrect.

Witness,

VanDrimmelen,

testified that the value without the diamond interchange influence
would have been between $1.00 and $1.50 per square foot. With the
benefit of the diamond interchange in the before condition, he
testified it had a value of $3.20 per square foot, a benefit of
considerably more than 100%. dinger, likewise, testified for UDOT
that the before value of $3.80 per square foot with the diamond
interchange was the same as the after value with the urban
interchange. Clinger, testified that the subject property being on
the diamond interchange was a "very good parcel of land, extremely
well located and a good development parcel."

[Tr. 790.]

UDOT witnesses and witnesses for the Owner referred to
Exhibits D-A and P-l

(Attachments 1 and 2) which showed the

condition of the subject property in the before condition.

These

Exhibits and the testimony of witnesses for UDOT and the Owner
established that the "relocated Cottonwood Canyon Road"

(6200

South) was, under the diamond design, relocated only within the
interchange area. It connected with the existing road system east
of the interchange before it reached the frontage of the subject
property.

This testimony was in accord with the trial court's

ruling on UDOT's Motion in Limine.
5. There was no prejudicial error committed by the trial
court and the jury verdict was well within the range of and
supported by the evidence.

This court should allow the jury

verdict to stand.

12

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellee, Utah Department of Transportation, seeks to
have this court affirm the verdict of the jury entered after the
trial of this case.
ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS RULINGS
REGARDING THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESS VANDRIMMELEN
RELATIVE TO HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH THE OWNER
REGARDING A NEGOTIATED OFFER.
1.

The "Offer" Testimony was Stricken by the Trial
Thus Mooting the Issue.

The rhetoric and arguments of the Owner regarding the
VanDrimmelen testimony are not only inappropriate but incorrect.
The questions regarding that issue were mooted by the trial court
in its ruling on the Owner's counsel's objection at trial. Counsel
objected that the "witnesses' last statement that somebody was
willing

to offer something

courtroom . . .

is clearly not

I object to it."

[Tr. 685.]

evidence

in this

The court ruling on

the objection was as follows:
THE COURT:

The portion of the answer that related

to a negotiated offer will be stricken from the
record.

[Tr. 685, 686.]

The portion of the VanDrimmelen testimony that the Owner
thought was objectionable was stricken.

The only part remaining

was his reference to other developments that existed having similar
characteristics to the subject in its after condition.
The Owner cannot complain where its objection has been

13

sustained>

This principle was enunciated by the Idaho Supreme

Court as follows:
Error is urged in permitting certain
witnesses to testify as to custom,
although such evidence was afterward
stricken. This court has heretofore
announced the rule that an appellant
cannot complaint of testimony stricken
from the record as prejudicial.
Baldwin v. Mittry, 102
1940). [Emphasis added.]

P.2d

643,

646

(Idaho

A similar result was reached by the Supreme Court of
Missouri in Pender v. Foeste. 329 S.W.2d 656# 662 (Mo. 1959).
Later, counsel requested further argument on the issue
and the court gave the jury this further instruction.
THE COURT:
given

by

There has been some testimony
the

witness

now

on

the

stand

regarding statements made by a Mr. Jacobsen
and confirmed by Chevron Oil, regarding the
value of the questioned property per square
foot.

Specifically, there was a reference

of $18 per square foot with access, $12 per
square foot without access.

Supposedly, that

value was confirmed by a representative of
Chevron Oil. Disregard the portion of the
expert witnesses testimony that referred to
that subject matter.

[Tr. 701.3

With the two instructions given by the court the "offer"
testimony was stricken and the Owner's basis for complaint ended.
2.

The Testimony of VanDrimmelen Regarding the
14

Negotiated Offer was Admissible.
Even if the VanDrimmelen testimony had survived it would
not have been error to allow it.
The Owner in this case, has misconstrued both the facts
and the law regarding the testimony of Mr. VanDrimmelen.

The

challenged testimony was in response to a question relating to
whether or not in his opinion the subject property would lose
commercial potential, if it had any, because of the taking and
access restrictions in its after condition.

[Tr. 683.]

This

question is clearly appropriate since the Owner contended and
through its witnesses testified that the taking virtually destroyed
all potential commercial development.

[Tr. 86, 87, 467, 472, 476,

289.]
In his

response

to this

question Mr. VanDrimmelen

testified that if the property had commercial potential in its
before condition it had it in the after condition. He gave as his
reasons

(1) there had been numerous examples where properties

similarly

situated

had

developed

which were

not

immediately

accessible off the interchange and (2) there had been an interest
in the subject property expressed by a commercial developer and
that interest continued after the taking.

[Tr. 684, 685.]

In a

conversation with Mr. Heber Jacobsen, a partner in the Owner's
Company, Mr. VanDrimmelen was told of the interest to purchase for
commercial purposes.

[Tr. 685.]

The testimony of Mr. VanDrimmelen regarding this offer
was not included as part of his comparable sales testimony he used
15

in determining land value. He used ten (10) comparable land sales
to support his conclusion of value of the subject property.
661 - 672.]

[Tr.

These comparables were consummated sales between

buyers and sellers.

As indicated above the offer which Mr.

Jacobson told Mr. VanDrimmelen about only went to the issue of use
and that there was a developer who had expressed an interest in the
property for a particular use.

This testimony was not "illicit"

without justification given the references by witnesses for the
Owner to the effect that no one would want the subject property for
commercial

uses

in

the

after

condition.

It

was

certainly

appropriate to show the inconsistency of the Owner's position.
There is support by way of precedent for the position
that offers are not admissible as a basis for value finding.

The

cases cited by the Owner in its brief, are not contrary to UDOT's
position. These cases indicate that "offers" should not be allowed
as comparable sales to support value conclusions.
present the testimony as a comparable sale.

DDOT did not

As "indicated the

VanDrimmelen use of the offer was not in support of his value
finding but in rebuttal to the Owner's claim regarding use.

The

major treatise on Eminent Domain in this country is Nichols on
Eminent Domain.

In this treatise it is stated that an offer is

admissible for the purpose of showing interest in property for a
particular use.

Nichols states the proposition as follows:

It has been held also that where
the purpose of the introduction of
offers to purchase is to show that there
is a demand for such property for a
special purpose, such evidence is admissible only insofar as it will prove
16

that such offers were made.
Vol. 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 21.4 [1] P. 21123 (Revised 3rd Edition, 1991)•
This position has been adopted by numerous courts in
various jurisdictions throughout the United States. In the City of
St. Louis v. Vasquez. 341 S.W. 2d 839# 848 (Mo. 1960) the court
allowed this type of testimony to come in and in doing so stated:
This testimony, indicating an active
interest in the land in question on the
part of prospective buyers, was relevant
on the question of general desirability
of and demand for this land.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held.
Testimony that offers were made
for property condemned is admissible
to show that the same is desirable and
marketable; however, testimony of the
amount of an offer by one who did not
make it would offend the 'Hearsay' rule.
. . .

Kelly v. Redevelopment Authority of Allegheny Co.
180 A. 2d 39, 45 (Penn. 1962)
In a case with a factual situation close to that in the
instant case a witness was asked whether or not any major oil
companies or motel businesses had approached the owner interested
in acquiring the property which was the subject of the eminent
domain action. In allowing the testimony that such interest in the
property had been expressed the court held:
Appellees respond that this evidence
was introduced only for the purpose of
showing that the property was suitable
for business purposes and that there was
a reasonable probability of that use in
the near future. . . . It is our opinion
that this evidence was properly submitted
and did not fall into the category of
offers which, of course, may not be shown.
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Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Turner.
497 S.W. 2d 57, 59 (Kan. 1973)
As indicated the testimony offered by Mr. VanDrimmelen
was for the purpose of responding to the Owner's claim that all
potential commercial use for the property had been destroyed.
went to the use of the property in its after condition.

It

Such

testimony as indicated is admissible for that purpose.
3.

The Statements by the Owner Regarding the
Offer Were Admissions Against Interest.

There is another reason why the VanDrimmelen testimony
should

have

been

admissible.

The

testimony

regarding

the

negotiations between the Owner and Chevron Oil was based on a
conversation between the witness and Mr. Jacobsen, a partner in the
Owner's Company.
property

could

condition.

The Owner's position at the trial was that the
not

be

developed

commercially

in

its

after

The testimony is admissible as an admission against

interest.
The Court of Appeals in Illinois admitted evidence of an
offer to purchase and held that even if it would not have been
admissible on other grounds it would have been admitted as an
admission against interest.

The Court stated:

Assuming, arguendo, that defendants
are correct in their previous contention,
the offer to purchase is still admissible
on other grounds. Illinois courts have held
that declarations by an owner that his property is worth less than what he contends at
trial are admissible as admissions against
interest.
Lake County Forest Preserve Dist. v. O'Malley.
421 N.E. 2d 980 (111. 1981)
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The general principles

regarding

admissions

against

interest are set out in American Jurisprudence 2nd as follows:
The admissions of a party made directly
by him or through his agent duly authorized
to speak for him, or by a privy, relative to
the subject matter of a suit are admissible
in evidence against such party where they are
inconsistent with the claim he asserts in the
action, whether he is the plaintiff or the
defendant and whether or not he is available
as a witness.
29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 600 P. 655.
In Korleski v. Needham. 222 N.E. 2d 334, 337 (111. 1966)
the Illinois Court of Appeals stated the principle as
follows:
Any statement, oral or written, voluntarily made by a party to an action that
contradicts the position taken by that party
may be introduced into evidence as an admission
against interest if it is pertinent to the
issues of the case. Ic|. at 337.
In the instant case, (1) the prior statements by Mr.
Jacobsen were clearly in contradiction to the position the Owner
took at trial and (2) the issue regarding developability of the
subject after the taking was certainly "pertinent to the issues of
the case."

Admissions against interest have been allowed into

evidence and sustained by the Utah Supreme Court.

In Reid v.

Owens, 98 Utah 50, 93 P.2d 680 (1939) the Utah Supreme Court
allowed comments made by a father about his son's careless driving
to stand as an admission against interest.
For the Owner to intimate that VanDrimmelen some how
acted unethically by suggesting he knew the testimony he was
offering was inadmissible is inexcusable. First, Mr. VanDrimmelen
19

is not a lawyer and not expected to know the rules of evidence but
secondly, and more importantly, the offered testimony was not
inadmissible according to substantial case and treatise authority.
II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING AN
EXPERT APPRAISAL WITNESS FOR UDOT TO TESTIFY
REGARDING DEVELOPMENTS AT INTERCHANGE SITES.
1*

The Testimony Regarding the Development of
Similar Sites was Proper Rebuttal.

As indicated earlier in this brief the Owner's witnesses
testified repeatedly that the subject property, because of the
access control, could not in the after condition be developed for
commercial purposes.

Its witnesses testimony was based on naked

assertions without any support therefore.

It is incomprehensible

that the Owner would challenge UDOT's witnesses' response that the
property could be developed and as support for that opinion offer
examples of properties with similar access limitations that had
been developed for those uses.

In essence what the Owner

is saying is that it is acceptable for it to express opinions that
the property can not be developed without support therefore but
DDOT should not be permitted to present evidence that it could be
developed for those uses and support that testimony with actual
instances where development has occurred.
The Owner also presented extensive testimony and introduced
into evidence an exhibit regarding a development scheme showing how
the subject could be developed.
D-E.]

[Tr. 171 - 175.] [Owner's Exhibit

This development plan had buildings, landscaping, parking

lots and interior roads located on the subject property, none of
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which existed.

The scheme was only devised by the witness,

Webster, the weekend before the beginning of the trial. It had not
been submitted to the county for approval.

[Tr. 182.]

There was

a canal and a creek running through the subject property.

The

proposed development did not take those features into account.
[Tr. 216, 217.]

The inconsistency of the Owner's position in

submitting into evidence unapproved, last minute, and incomplete
plans for the development of the subject property on the one hand
and then objecting to the reference by UDOT's witness, Clinger, to
interchange areas that had been developed on the other is glaring.
Plaintiff

submits the testimony of Mr. Clinger was

appropriate and the court's rulings relating thereto were correct.
2.

The Examples Used by Mr. Clinger were to Demonstrate
Developability and Were Not Offered as Comparable

The examples used by the witness, Clinger, were for the
purpose of evaluating accessibility to determine the developability
of properties situated similarly to the subject.
812, 818.]

[Tr. 806, 807,

Mr. Clinger in this regard stated:
My comparison here is only for accessability.

I am not attempting to compare

value here, at all.

For accessibility,

they are quite similar.

[Tr. 812.]

Mr. Clinger testified regarding five developments on or
near interchanges that had been developed for commercial-business
type uses.

The purpose was to show that investors have been

willing to invest considerable resources to develop properties with
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access restrictions similar to the subject. The Owner's witnesses
testified that property with access control like that on 6200 South
near the subject rendered it not "developable."

[Tr. 86, 87, 467,

471, 472, 477.]
The Owner challenged the dinger testimony on the basis
that the examples were not comparable sales.
misconstrued the purpose of the testimony.
offered

in

support

of

Mr.

dinger's

[Tr. 815.] The Owner
The testimony was

opinion

regarding

the

property's "use" potential and not as comparable sales in support
of his value conclusion. The testimony indicated that the subject
property could be developed with the access restrictions for
purposes which the Owner's witnesses testified it could not. Major
commercial users such as K-Mart [Tr. 812; Ex. P-19.], Sizzler [Tr.
816; Ex. P-20.], Village Inn [Tr. 817; Ex. P-21.], and Valley Fair
Mall [Tr. 818; Ex. P-22.] have developed on properties with access
restrictions similar to the subject.

Mr. dinger had earlier

submitted five comparable sales in support of his conclusions as to
value.

[Tr. 797 - 801.]
One

of

the

six

interchange

developments

the Owner

complained about was submitted by Mr. dinger as a comparable sale
(Price Savers' Property.)

It was property that had been sold and

developed with access controlled frontage located on an interchange
that indicated not only the developability of such property but
also that there was no reduction in the sales price for such
properties.

[Tr. 800, 820, 821.]

The Owner, in its brief incorrectly lists factors that it
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characterizes as being things the witness "was unable to tell the
court."

[Appellants' Brief P. 11.]

First, counsel for the Owner

did not ask this witness for the information.

On voir dire the

only question he asked was whether or not dinger used a "sale
transaction" for comparability.

[Tr. 813, 815.]

Clinger was not

ask any questions relative to the issues listed on P. 11.

The

statement that the witness was "unable" to tell the court about
those issues is incorrect.
those factors.

He simply was not asked about all of

Second, the list of factors the Owner claimed the

witness could not tell the Court about included access.
witness did discuss the access to the properties.

The

dinger's

testimony in this regard was:
On U.S. 89 there is no access to the
K-Mart store.

You must turn on Shephard

Lane, and drive down to the entry to the
K-Mart store.

[Tr. P. 812.]

Similarly he testified about the access to the other
properties he referred to.
3.

[Tr. 814, 820.]

The Law is Well Settled that Factors Such as Those
Considered by Mr. dinger Should be Considered in
Appraising Prpp^rtieg.

It is well established in Eminent Domain law that an
expert appraisal witness should take into account those factors
that a willing buyer and a willing seller would consider in making
a transaction.

This proposition is stated in Nichols on Eminent

Domain as follows:
All factors which would be considered
by a reasonable purchaser and seller in
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fixing value should be considered by the
witness in reaching his opinion.
Vol. 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 23.07 [1] P. 2374. (Revised 3rd Edition, 1991.)
It is certainly "reasonable" to conclude that both a buyer and a
seller of an interchange property would be interested in how other
sites with similar attributes have been developed.

To adopt a

-position that buyers and sellers would not consider such factors is
unreasonable.
The Utah Supreme Court has endorsed this approach.

In

Redevelopment Aa. of Salt Lake City v. Mitsui. Inv. Inc., 522 P.2d
1370 (Utah 1974) the Court stated:
It is true that the appraisers should
take into account all facts and circumstances
relating to the property which he thinks has
a bearing on value: and that this may include
any potential use or development which is to
be expected with reasonable certainty. But
the work of an appraiser, though it can be in
a sense factual and scientific in some of its
aspects is also an art, in that it reflects
the creative talents, the experience, the
integrity, and in sum, the personalized
judgment of the individual appraiser. It
is his prerogative to select and analyze
the various factors which seem important
to him in arriving at his estimate as to
value. Therefore, no one should be able
to put him in a straight-jacket as to his
method; . . .
Id. at 1373.

[Emphasis added.]

The Court of Appeals in Ohio stated this principle
clearly as follows:
All factors which would be considered
by willing, able, fully informed buyers and
sellers in fixing the value should be considered by the witness in reaching his
opinion. . • .
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To adopt a rule of law which closes the
courtroom door to the appraiser with a keen
ear for the things which move the markets up
and down would make as much sense as to close
the courtroom to doctors who cannot resurrect
Louis Pasteur to first testify as to his
original experiments.
Mashiter v. C.H. Hooker Trucking Co., 250 N.E. 2d
621, 622 (Ohio, 1969).
UDOT submits that the reference by witness dinger to
developments in the area of similarly situated properties was not
only proper, but was what all of the appraisal witnesses should
have done.

One of the Owner's appraisal witnesses testified that

factors such as those taken into account by Mr. Clinger are
commonly considered by appraisers.

Mr. Cook stated on direct

examination:
. . . The highest and best use of this
property, I think, is basically determined by
the probabilities of what could be done with
this property.

In other words, its location,

its access features and some of the conditional
uses listed under the zoning.

The master plan

that was taken into consideration.
Not only that, but what other properties
in similar locations under similar circumstances have been developed into. We also
take into consideration competitive properties and what thev were developed into or
planned to be developed into.
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I think all of

these things have to be taken into consideration and really what the highest probable
use must be analyzed and concluded.
[Tr. 263.] (Emphasis added.)
The properties that Mr. dinger surveyed fit exactly into
the category indicated by Mr. Cook as being something an appraiser
should consider in making his appraisal.
4.

The Cases Cited by the Owner in its Brief
are not Contrary to UDOT's Position.

The Owner has cited no case to support the position that
dinger's

testimony

regarding

developed

interchange

sites is

inadmissible. The cases cited in its brief are distinguishable.
In Carpet Barn v. State, by and through Dep't. of Transp. . 786 P.2d
770 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) . 1) the testimony offered was not used as
a basis for an appraisal witness expert testimony, 2) in the
instant case testimony was presented that the access restrictions
were similar to those of the subject property.

Access conditions

of both the subject and the developed properties were explained,
and 3) the testimony offered was in rebuttal to testimony offered
by the Owner.

26

Ill
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS RULINGS
REGARDING HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS ASKED ON
CROSS-EXAMINATION.
1.

Counsel for the Owner was Allowed to Ask
Questions Covering All Points it Attempted
to Cover Including Hypothetical Questions.

Counsel for the Owner asked witness VanDrimmelen twice
during cross examination to assume that the subject property was
something different from what it was.

VanDrimmelen was asked to

assume that the north portion of the subject property had sold off
"before the taking, from the south."

[Tr. 720.]

This not only

called for an assumption of facts not in evidence but called for an
assumption of facts contrary to the evidence.

Counsel was given

the opportunity to "rephrase the question." The question was asked
again in basically the same way.

[Tr. 721.]

Counsel was allowed

to ask questions about the Owner losing its flexibility to divide
the subject into smaller pieces because of the taking.
examination was allowed.

This

[Tr. 723.]

Later, when counsel asked Mr. VanDrimmelen (not Mr.
Clinger as indicated in Appellee's Brief, P. 13) to assume facts
contrary to the evidence regarding access to the subject, an
objection was sustained. However, when counsel asked the question
in the true form of a hypothetical using hypothetical properties
and not the subject he was allowed to pursue that questioning.
[Tr. 761, 762.]

The Owner was in fact allowed to cross examine

using hypothetical

questions that did not assume, by making

reference to the subject property, facts that were contrary to the
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evidence.

This, UDOT submits, moots

the issue relative to

hypothetical questions.
2.

The Use of Hypothetical Questions is Discretionary,
and the Trial Court Did Not Abuse That Discretion in
Disallowing the Owner's Hypothetical Questions.

Assuming arcruendo that the Owner is correct and it was
not allowed to ask all of the hypothetical questions it wanted to,
there still would have been no error committed by the trial court.
The use of hypothetical questions is only allowed in the sound
discretion of the trial court. The case of State v. Peek, 265 P.2d
630 (Utah 1953), relied upon by the Owner, clearly states that it
is discretionary.

The court in the Peek case quoted from Nichols

on Eminent Domain when it stated that "in the discretion of the
court." a witness may be asked questions on cross examination not
allowed on direct. Id. at 138 [Emphasis added.]

In the Peek case

the issue was whether or not a witness could be cross-examined
regarding sales of property that were similar to the property being
appraised. The court ruled that such examination was6correct. It
referred to the Nichols citation in support of this principle. Id.
at

637.

The use

of

hypothetical

questions

generally,

and

particularly those assuming facts not in evidence, was not an issue
in the Peek case. What is clear from the Nichols citation in the
Peek case is that questions of this nature are discretionary with
the court.
3.

Hypothetical Questions Should Not be Asked That
Assume Facts That Are Contrary to the Evidence.

The leading case in Utah dealing with the use of facts
not in evidence as a basis for a hypothetical question during cross
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examination is Nichols v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co.. 25 Utah 240,
70 P. 996 (1902) . Contrary to the erroneous interpretation of this
case by the Owner, the issue in Nichols was the use of assumed
facts not in evidence in a hypothetical question asked during
cross-examination.

The Court stated in this regard:

Upon cross-examination, plaintiff's
counsel asked the witness the following
question . • . [question and objection
omitted]. We think this objection should
have been sustained. The hypothetical
question thus submitted assumed facts
which indisputably had neither been
proven, nor in truth existed. [Citation
omitted.] It is a proposition too
simple to require any citation of authorities that the material facts assumed in
a hypothetical question must be proven on
trial, or, rather, that there must be
evidence on the trial tending to prove
them; otherwise it is error to allow them
to be answered. Icl. at 247
The A.L.R. citation that is relevant to UD0T#s position
on this issue is 71 A.L.R. 2d § 7(b) P. 6 wherein it states:
In a number of jurisdictions it has
been held that a hypothetical question
asked on cross-examination of an expert
may not properly assume facts not in
evidence.5 Under this view it follows
a fortiori that a hypothetical question
may not assume facts contrary to the
weight of the evidence. [Emphasis added.]
One of the cases cited in footnote 5 of the above quote
is the Nichols case. 56 A.L.R.3d § 6(b) 300 at 323 referred to by
the Owner in its brief * is not contrary to this provision as the
Owner suggests it is.

It states that "although some courts have

concluded . . . that hypothetical questions must only assume facts
in evidence regardless of the nature of the examination being
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conducted,w others have concluded otherwise.

[Emphasis added.]

Utah is obviously included within the category of "some courts"
that do not allow such questions.

The Owner's assertions in its

brief both as to UDOT's lack of precedents and interpretation of
those offered is incorrect.

Courts in other jurisdictions have

refused to allow the use of hypothetical questions in the crossexamination of expert witnesses which assumed either facts not in
evidence or facts contrary to the evidence. Barretto v. Akau. 463
P.2d 917 (Haw. 1969); Peterson v. Schlottman. 392 P.2d 262 (Or.
1964); Fluckey v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 838 F.2d 302
(8th Cir. 1988).
The question in reality is a tempest in a teapot in that
counsel for the Owner was allowed to ask hypothetical questions so
long as he did not ask the witness to assume facts relative to the
subject property that were contrary to the evidence.
IV
THE TESTIMONY OF UDOT WITNESSES WAS IN
ACCORD WITH THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON
ITS MOTION IN LIMINE AS TO THE DIAMOND
INTERCHANGE DESIGN.
The Owner's contention that UDOT witnesses "subverted and
violated" the law of the case is absolutely and unequivocally
wrong.

It is shocking that such a claim would even be made.

The

testimony of all of the UDOT witnesses was based on the diamond
interchange design that had been adopted by UDOT in 1973 and was
the design used in the Bettilyon II case.

A copy of that design

was introduced into evidence by UDOT and used by all of its
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witnesses in determining the before value of the subject property.
[UDOT's Exhibits P-l, P-5.]

There was no objection to these

Exhibits,
It is the Owner who now is trying to change the "law of
the case" by trying to have facts added to the case that simply did
not exist in the 1973 design. The Owner's own witnesses testified
that

the

relocation

of

Cottonwood

Canyon Road

east

of the

interchange would interconnect with the existing road system.
[Owner's Exhibit D-A, Attachment 1.]
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that were
entered by the trial court after hearing DDOT's Motion in Limine
provided:
At the time Bettilyon II was filed
by UDOT with this court, UDOT had committed
to and final plans at that time were approved
for the construction of the 1-215 freeway
interchange as set out in the right-of-way
maps and plans attached by UDOT to its
condemnation complaint. [Tr. 199.]
10. At the time Bettilyon II was filed
in 1973, as well as the time of settlement in
1980, UDOT did not have any plans, designs or
proposals that would suggest any additional
parts of the remaining Bettilyon property, now
the subject of the February 8, 1988 filing in
this case, would be necessary for the construction
or realization of the 1-215 freeway and 6200
South Street. [Tr. 200.]
The Owner would now, apparently, change the facts of the
case to include a road project for the relocation and/or widening
of

6200 South

(Cottonwood

Canyon Road) east

of

the diamond

interchange to be considered in the valuation of the property
before the taking.

If that contention were true, one must ask:
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Where is the design for the road referred to in the record of this
proceeding?; What was the alignment of this mythical road?; How
much of the Owner's property would have been needed for the design
of this expanded road?; Would the Owner have any frontage on it
and, if so, how much?; What would the Owner do if that hypothetical
road project included access restrictions?; and When would it have
been designed?

There is nothing in the record to support the

Owner's position regarding this issue.
The only design for the continuation of 6200 South
(Cottonwood Canyon Road) to the east of the diamond interchange
"area" is the design of the connector road (that road connecting
Wasatch Boulevard with the urban interchange, part of the design
for the after condition).

That design is shown on the aerial

photograph of the construction of the urban interchange which was
received in evidence, without objection.

[UDOT's Exhibit P-2,

Attachment 3.]
The Owner's witness DeMass prepared Exhibit D-A which
depicted its position regarding the subject property in the before
condition. His testimony when asked by counsel for the Owner was:
Q.

As of February, 1988, what was
the then condition of the design
of the freeway and frontage roads,
non-access lines, and right-of-way
lines, as you have shown them on
Exhibit A?

A.

At that point in time, the Department
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of Transportation was committed and
dedicated to the plans that were complete
at that particular time, which I have
depicted on this exhibit.
Q.

How long had they, as of that time?

A.

I believe 1973, since 1973.
[Tr. 77.]

Exhibit D-A shows the road system as being the same as
UDOT's witnesses assumed in their testimony.
With regard to the road system in the before condition
Mr. DeMass further testified:
Q.

Mr. DeMass, you analyzed the road
conditions both before and after the
taking, I assume, did you not?

A.

I did.

Q.

With regard to Big Cottonwood Canyon
Road, that's a two-lane road facility
prior to the construction of the facility
in this case?

A.

That's correct.
[Tr. 95.]

Mr. DeMass'

testimony

was

to

the

effect

that

the

conditions surrounding the diamond interchange design (the before
conditions) were all known. This would necessarily include such an
important element as the roadway east of the interchange upon which
the Owner's property abutted, and which it now claims would somehow
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be changed in character from what it was at the time of the 1973
diamond design.

His testimony was as follows in answer to

questions asked by counsel for the Owner:
Q.

There was also asked a question
about whether you had done an actual
traffic study and analysis in connection
with your testimony and opinion in this
case.

Do you remember that?

A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

Did you think that was wrong?

A.

No.

Q.

To do an actual traffic analysis?

A.

No.

Q.

Why not?

A.

It had already been done by the
State in the design process of the
first two designs. We were given a
piece of property with all the knowns.
We had access along the northwest side,
we had access along the north side,
along the east side.

Those were

knowns.

The roadway was designed.

. . .

[Tr. 123.] [Emphasis added.]

The accesses referred to were the frontage road designed
under the diamond configuration and Cottonwood Canyon Road (6200
South) and 3000 East. The first two designs were for the Bettilyon
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I and Bettilyon II cases. There was no new design for those roads
in 1973 either for widening them or realigning them that was put
into evidence by any witness.

Mr. Webster, one of the Owner's

other witnesses testified that in the before scenario the road
under the diamond interchange connected with the existing road
system.

[Tr. 202 - 205.]

The position of the witnesses for the

Owner was that access to the existing road system was vital to the
development of the property. None of its witnesses testified to a
"relocated" or "expanded" road system east and south of the diamond
interchange in the before condition.
The Owner has attempted to distort the testimony further
by suggesting that UDOT's witnesses did not take into account the
beneficial effects of the diamond interchange.

(Appellant's Brief

P. 35.) This comment is not true and is contrary to the evidence.
Mr. VanDrimmelen in his testimony for UDOT said in his
opinion the subject property before the taking would have been
worth

from

$1.00

to

$1.50 per

square

foot

if

the

diamond

interchange influence were not considered and $3.20 with the
influence of the diamond interchange.

His testimony of the value

of the subject before the taking was $3.20 per square foot.

[Tr.

672, 710.]
Mr. dinger, one of UDOT's witnesses in his testimony
regarding the condition of the property before the taking said:
. • . I have inspected this property.
I know it to be a very good location.

It is

one of the final interchange locations that
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will be available for development in this
valley, on the manor freeway system,

. ..

It has access along an established roadway,
that is good.

It is going to be on the

interstate freeway system.

. . . The prop-

erty has suitable development slopes.

It is

not going to be a major problem to develop
this land.
Physically, it is well configured for
a number of different types of use.
frontage and access are good.

Its

So I see no

problems in the general development portion
of the property.

. . . The property also

has a frontage road that will run along the
westerly side of the property.

And being on

the interchange, I feel this is a very good
parcel of land, extremely well located, and
a good development parcel.
[Tr. 790.]

[Emphasis added.]

The problem the Owner is apparently having with UDOT's
witnesses' testimony is that those witnesses said the subject was
not only a good property before the taking with the diamond
interchange design but also a good parcel of land after the
construction of the urban interchange.
interchange location.

It still retained its

The urban interchange provided for more

efficient and smoother movement of traffic than the diamond.
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The

newly created controlled intersection at 3000 East and 6200 South
provided needed traffic control.

The fact that the existing road

system east of the interchange had some deficiencies was only one
of the factors considered, but was not a factor that restricted
development or affected value.

It is baffling to think that the

Owner would contend that UDOT's witnesses could not or should not
take all of the factors both before and after the taking and
construction into consideration in evaluating the property.
As indicated earlier, the 1973 diamond interchange design
for 1-215 at the time of the filing of the Bettilyon II case
provided the factual basis for the before value.

As the Owner

argued at the Motion in Limine the Owner was entitled to rely on
that

design

in

determining

values.

Section

78-34-10

provides:
The court, jury or referee must hear
such legal evidence as may be offered by
any of the parties to the proceedings, and
thereupon must ascertain and assess:
(1)

...

(2) If the property sought to be
condemned constitutes only a part of a
larger parcel, the damages which will
accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of its severance
from the portion sought to be condemned
and the construction of the improvement
in the m$tnn$r pypppgefl fry %h$ plaintiff.
(3)

...

(4) Separately, how much the portion
not sought to be condemned . . . will be
benefited, if at all, by the construction
of the improvement as proposed by the
plaintiff. . . .
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U.C.A.

[Emphasis added]
The Bettilyon

II case was tied

to the design and

construction "as proposed." Neither the diamond interchange design
of 1973 nor its design anytime thereafter included relocation of or
otherwise improvements to Big Cottonwood Canyon Road (6200 South)
east of the interchange.

[Exhibits P-l# P-5# D-A.]

It was that

design that was used as a basis for the testimony of all witnesses
for the before conditions of the subject property.
V
THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR MANDATING
THE AWARD OF A NEW TRIAL EITHER ON ANY
POINT RAISED BY THE OWNER OR CUMULATIVELY.
THE VERDICT WAS WELL WITHIN THE RANGE OF
THE TESTIMONY.
UDOT submits that the Owner has failed to establish
that the trial court committed error in its rulings on any of the
points raised in its brief.

If there were any irregularities at

the trial, they were insignificant and not prejudicial.

Most of

the errors claimed by the Owner would only go to the weight of
evidence not its admissibility.
The major difference between the witnesses for UDOT and
those of the Owner related to severance damages to the remaining
property after the taking.

The difference in values before the

taking was relatively small:
VanDrimmelen's
dinger's
Cook's
Brown's

before
before
before
before

value
value
value
value

was
was
was
was

$3.20
$3.75
$3.90
$4.30

per
per
per
per

sq.
sg.
sq.
sq.

ft.
ft.
ft.
ft.

There was a greater difference between Owner's witnesses
Cook and Brown ($.40 per sq. ft.) than between UDOT's witness
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dinger

and Owner's witness

Cook

($.15 per

sq.

ft.).

The

differences in testimony as to severance damage amounts were
significant.

They were:

dinger
VanDrimmelen
Cook
Brown

$

28,800.00
30,870.00
1,189,147.00
1,316,534.00

The jury awarded $144,607.60 as severance damage. This
award was well within the range of the testimony.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that it is "within the
province of the jury to give such weight to the testimony of each
of the experts as the jury thought it was entitled to and it was
for the jury alone to decide what weight, if any, should be given
to the testimony of any witness."

State Road Commission v.

Taaaart. 19 Utah 2d 247, 250, 430 P.2d 167 (1967).
added.)
scope

(Emphasis

With regard to the issue of the verdict being within the
of

the

evidence

relative

to

severance

damages

in

a

condemnation case the court in the Taacrart case said:
. . . the finding of the jury in
respect to the severance damage was
within the range of the testimony upon
that subject matter. We are of the
opinion that there is a reasonable
basis in the evidence for the finding
of the jury in respect to damages and
that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying defendants motion
for a new trial. . . .
13. at 250.
UDOT submits that there was ample support for the jury
verdict in the instant case and its decisions regarding both land
values and severance damages were well within the range of the
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testimony. Where the verdict is within the range of the testimony
the presumption supports it.
this regard:

The Utah Supreme Court has said in

MA311 presumptions favor the verity of the verdict

and judgment; and this includes all aspects of the conduct of the
proceedings and rulings of the court.11

Redevelopment ACT, of Salt

Lake C. v. Mitsui Inv. . Inc.. Supra at 1374.

The trial court in

the instant case neither committed reversible error during the
trial nor abused its discretion in denying the Owner's Motion for
new trial.
CONCLUSION
The parties in this case had a fair opportunity to
present their evidence to the jury.

The jury returned a verdict

well within the range of the credible evidence.

The trial court

did not commit any prejudicial or reversible error.

The trial

court had an opportunity to review the evidence and its rulings in
acting on the Owner's Motion for New Trial. It denied the request.
UDOT respectfully submits that the trial court's rulings during the
trial and the hearing on the Motion for New Trial were correct and
it urges this court to sustain the jury verdict and the rulings of
the trial court.
DATED this y ^

,
day of November, 1992.

DONALD S-T COLEMAN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that four copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellee were mailed first class, postage prepaid, to
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. and Kevin Egan Anderson, Attorneys for
Defendants and Appellants, One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor, 201
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 9th day of
November, 1992.
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ADDENDUM

ATTACHMENT 1
Owner's Exhibit D-A
Base Map of Subject Property Before the Taking
Diamond Interchange Features Shown
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ATTACHMENT 2
UDOT's Exhibit P-1
Aerial Photograph of Subject Before the Taking
Diamond Interchange Features Superimposed in Color

ATTACHMENT 3
UDOT's Exhibit P-2
Aerial Photograph of Subject After the Taking
Urban Interchange Shown as Constructed

